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Important here is the fact that the notion of "exterior" is expressed, in many 
European languages, by a word that means "at the door" (fores is, in Latin, the 
door of the house, Jueajen, in Greek,  literally signifying "at the doorstep"). 
The exterior is not another determined space, but the passage, the exteriority 
that gives access to it - in a word: its face, its eidos. The doorstep is not, in this 
sense, another thing in relation to the limit; it is the experience , so to speak, of 
the limit itself, the being inside of an exterior.  
G. Agamben  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 Recent  efforts to re-interpret Wittgenstein's work  have led, in some longitudes 
of philosophical commentary 1,  to the development of several currents of analysis 
leading to the reinforcement, against a certain established tradition2, of the wholistic 
dominant in the work of the Anglo-Austrian author.  
 The range of problems analysed in such work, oscillating between the study of 
propositional logic and ethics, philosophy of language and aesthetics, or between 
psychology and phenomenology, seem, in fact, to reflect the exploration of a conceptual 
lode kept in perspective from the existential disorder of the Philosophical Diaries 1914-
1916 and reaching up to the systematic dramaturgy of the Philosophical Investigations. 
In the course of these texts the consistency of the system erected by the philosophical 
tradition would suffer a dramatic blow, for such a system could not support a behaviour 
with therapeutical intentions able to read each detail of philosophical common speech 
under the lucidity and violence of a "direct light". Generally speaking, this light was to 
be focused upon the functioning of knowledge as representation, groundstone of this 
philosophical tradition ever since its Platonic foundations:  
"Socrates to Theaetetus: "And whoever has an idea, shouldn't he have an idea of 
something?" -Theaetetus: "Certainly." - Socrates: "And whoever has an idea of 
something, shouldn't he have an idea of something real?" - Theaetetus: "It seems that 
way." "(Zettel, 69) 
 Classical representation emerged, from its very beginning, as a sort of interface 
between two domains inaugurated with the Platonic-Aristotelian anthropological and 
ontological fracture: between "mind" and "world" as between "sign" and "referent", 
                                                 
1 Namely, the Anglo-saxonic space of authors like David Charles McCarthy (1991), particularly 
interesting because of his criticism of the  English translation of the Tractatus made by Pears and 
McGuinness and where all the passages that more clearly defended the wholistic logical theory would be 
systematicaly sabotaged, or David Stern (1991).  
 
2  Represented today by authors such as Jaako Hintikka. 
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language stabilises itself in its denotative function, and the solid fixation of the concepts 
was needed so that the traffic of meaning between the transcendent and the immanent 
planes, i.e., the transcendental game, would be possible. As it creates the conditions of 
meaning, tradition engages theoretical discourse in an internalistic voyage which is to 
become the master project in the history of philosophy from its hellenic dawn. This 
voyage consisted of two main guidelines: a) the determination of the referent underlying 
each proposition, its body of meaning ("Bedeutungskörper"), the search for a desired 
"beyond the sign"; b) the recovery of the ego structure responsible for the enunciation, 
the attempt to present the "before the sign". The work of Wittgenstein, by questioning 
such "two worlds' mythology", has launched contemporary thought into a re-evaluation 
of philosophical discourse as a whole, and a revisiting of the foundations of theory.  
The objective of this article is to illustrate the wholistic dominant in 
Wittgenstein and its importance in the progress of the denunciation of the fracture 
between two supposedly heterogeneous planes (planes that we shall  simplistically name 
"interior" and "exterior"). In order to analyse the different aspects of this delation, we 
shall begin with the germinal core formed by the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, then 
take a look at the Blue and Brown Books as essential platforms to understanding the 
dialogue held between the two most important phases of their author's thought, and 
finally approach the subject of "how to follow a rule", central in the context of the 
Philosophical Investigations.  
 
 
2. Logical wholism 
 
 
  At first glance, the literary core constituted by the Philosophical Diaries and 
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus could be  easily thought to represent an attempt to 
justify the process of denotation in language and a consistent summary of the logico-
atomistic project of Frege and Russell, thus inscribed in the sort of ontological quest 
previously mentioned. The task of analytical decomposition of language, reducing each 
complex proposition to its simpler elements, would not only allow us to respond  to a 
necessity for logical and linguistical order but would also lead us to some significant 
ontological consequences. To go back in the propositional structure - i.e., to disassemble 
a complex proposition in the elementary propositions of which it is a truth function 
(according to the "Extensionality Thesis" 3) - would correspond, according to the 
Picture Theory, to a going back in the referent structure. The admission of the structural 
isomorphism between both planes  - the "logical form" - would allow, in the Tractatus, 
to the formation of some correspondent pairs: "complex proposition" - "state of affairs"; 
"name" - "object". In this way, Frege and Russell's atomism would continue to 
participate in a punctilistical vision of reality and accept the principle according to 
which to reflect upon the referent means to catalogue its constituents, a task common to 
semantics (ontology) and to syntax (logic). Wittgenstein's somewhat different 
perspective resides precisely at the level of analytical decomposition: on the one hand, 
Tractatus' "world" is not a "sum" but a "totality", i.e., it is not the product of an 
eternally delayed inventory of constituent elements assembled as if in a mosaic, but 
rather the recognition of a given horizon (which presupposes an operation of mystical, 
                                                 
3  Cf. Tractatus §5. 
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ethical and a aesthetical proportions 4); on the other hand, the need to attend to logic's 
self-sufficiency is consistently referred to, and that means refusing any ontological 
contamination of the logical analysis. 
 In relation to the prevalance of a wholistic perspective regarding the behaviour 
of language, it has to be considered the important role played by proposition 3.42 of the 
Tractatus, and its establishment of a relation of mutual implication between each 
proposition and the totality of the logical space:  
 
 "The proposition extends itself through the logical space."  
 
 The German verb "übergreift" (here translated by "extends itself") reinforces the 
role of the proposition as a unifying principle, running through the entire logical system 
in a global form, as a foundational condition of any discursive articulation, while 
simultaneously requiring, for its own functioning and inteligibility, the coming together 
of the entire logical space, i.e., the proposition only acquires meaning from the moment 
it re-assembles the general system of logical coordinates in order to integrate itself 
within, constituting itself as a re-organisation of this space-system while simultaneously 
reflecting and pointing to this environment that circumscribes it and from which it 
derives its meaning:  
 
"Every now and then, one feels that in the elementary proposition one also speaks about 
every object." (Philosophical Diaries, 13.7.16).  
 
 On the other hand , the reinforcement of the self-sufficient character of logic is 
reflected, namely in:  
 
a) the suspicion felt against the admission of logical constants;  
 
b) the attempts to develop a strictly operationalistic interpretation of formal logic 
(for example, truth operations based upon the negation operation N (x) or the 
logical method of Truth Tables) as a defence against Frege and Russell's logical 
realism (eg. Russell's inventories proposing examples of elementary 
propositions, an attempt to justify language in an extra-logical way).  
 
c) the importance granted to the extensionality thesis, which,  together with the 
analytical operationalism made possible by the Tractatus' breakthroughs, would 
allow the analysis of llogico-linguistic behaviour as an automatic process and a 
priori formulation;  
 
d) the possibility of a use theory of language within the Tractatus, according to 
which it would be possible to acknowledge the importance given to the 
                                                 
4 One has to mention in this context  the "non- experience that something is" mentioned in proposition 
5.552 of the Tractatus, i.e., the acknowledgement of the "What", the anticipated awareness (condition of 
Logic itself) that things exist, the rumour of the "world's substance" (Tractatus §2.0211), the elimination 
of all analytical temptations regarding the "aesthetical miracle" of the world as limited totality (cf. 
Philosophical Diaries, 20.10.16; one should attend to the importance given by Wittgenstein to the works 
of Angelus Silesius). 
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application of Logic ['Anwendung der Logik' 5]; this possibility allows us to 
preview  Wittgenstein's future evolution by reinforcing the pragmatic component 
of language, namely, when he identifies meaning with the trajectory that the sign 
makes among the subject's actions:  
 
"(When everything happens as if a sign has meaning, then it really has meaning.)" 
(Tractatus, §3.328)  
 
 In this sense and especially when one considers the underlying "use theory", 
"elementary proposition" and "world" must be read as transcendental structures, i.e., as 
constituents of language with a specific function without which speech development 
would not be possible. Thus, more than the search for a denotational or ontological 
justification for language, picture theory should be read as the moment where 
Grammatology outshines Ontology.  More than frontier terms by which the "language's 
antennas" touch their referent, "elementary proposition" and "world" (concepts that are 
to be found at the end of atomistical analysis) become internal conditions of language 
itself, foundation elements of discourse’s architecture:  
 
"It seems that the idea of the simple is already within that of the complex and that of 
analysis, in such a way that, independently of any possible examples of simple objects 
or of propositions that speak about simple objects, we come to this idea and we 
understand the existence of simple objects as a logical necessity - a priori." 
(Philosophical Diaries, 14.6.15).  
 
 According to this, it is possible to answer a question with an elementary 
proposition if one understands the elementary proposition on a strictly functional basis, 
and if it is taken as one of the conditions (or topics 6)of the discourse. The  interpretation 
of the statute of language's terminal poles - "elementary proposition" and "world" - as 
transcendental structures of discourse (thereby delivering them from their ontological 
significance) points to the need to intertwine the Tractatus' picture theory with 
increasingly intense manifestation of a use theory 7 of language. Thus, more than the 
refusal of the past, Wittgenstein's interest in non-declarative discourse (intention 
discourse, anticipation discourse, and verification discourse) or the substitution of the 
concept "calculus" for that of "game", serving as metaphor for the explicitation of the 
linguistic proceedings, constitute nothing more than developments of a conception 
already present in the Tractatus.  
It is as if Wittgenstein, by leading his investigations towards the clarification of 
the role of the elementary proposition (which, consequently, would point to the "world's 
substance"), would actually be looking for one of those "tacit agreements for the 
understanding of current language" referred to in proposition 4.002. To acknowledge 
the role of  elementary propositions puts an end to the constant indefinition of 
propositions in general language, since the former behave as ultimate residues and 
supporters of the meaning. To this legitimisation the universe of complex propositions 
                                                 
5 Cf. Tractatus §5.557, 3.262, 3.326, 3.327. 
 
6 Cf. MacCarthy, 1991: 102. 
  
7  Cf. Riverso, 1970. 
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answers back with another legitimisation because the propositional complex now 
emerges as the vital environment outside of which the simple does not survive:  
 
"The name only occurs in connection with the elementary proposition." (Tractatus, 
4.23)  
"Only the proposition has meaning; a name only has denotation in connection with the 
proposition." (Tractatus, 3.3)  
"The totality of propositions is language." (Tractatus, 4.001)  
 
 Thus, more than the establishment of isolated links connecting each basic 
element of language to its worldly correlative, naming is the result of the balance of 
forces evident in the propositional complex 8 (hence the possibility of identifying the 
denotative function of language with its strictly narrative capacity...).  
On the other hand, the atomistic path was still a participant in the "angelical 
point of view" that characterizes the entire metaphysical solipsism, i.e., the development 
of an activity that tries to keep "a foot outside and a foot inside" 9 language, to fly over 
the proposition and its referent, to compare them, to establish the exact causes why 
linguistic protocols miss their attempt to access the world, to propose the ultimate 
logical axioms, to reach the end simples that allow us to think the pictorial essence of 
language (to know what we are talking about when we are talking about something), to 
speak about objects and things, and to reconciliate language and world in a conceptual 
embracement. Like the spectre of the angel that escapes from the surface of the "big 
mirror" where language and world assume common features, and finally reaches a 
Syrian point where the answers to all the major philosophical questions (supposedly, 
meaningful questions) lie. This desire to escape is naturally refused by Wittgenstein and 
the Tractatus is itself presented as the description of an itinerary along which scientific 
and logico-linguistic questions are followed but only to a certain extent. The book 
carefully delineates a "point of no return", one which, in fact, the philosophical tradition 
has not hesitated to ignore, but  only to have lost itself. When the search for the limit 
(namely, the general form of elementary propositions) meets the limit of the search, the 
mode of investigation is no longer a conceptual but rather a mystical, ethical or aesthetic 
one. This was in fact the path taken by the  Tractatus in its literary form.  
 
 
3. The refusal of parallel processes  
 
 
 With the Blue and Brown Books, the time had come to consider psychologist and 
egologist tendencies within the philosophical tradition here named under the 
emblematic figures of Augustine and Descartes.  
Mentalism, ontologism, mechanicism, abstractionism, contingentism, solipsistic 
privativism: these are the modern forms directly or indirectly subsdiary of the interior-
exterior dualism of Cartesian extraction. These forms carry on such a dualism either 
through the idea of the words’ internal meaning (the opposition meaning - expression) 
or through the  relevance given to introspective analysis as an ideal platform for 
                                                 
8 Regarding the importance of the notion of "complex ", cf. Tractatus §5.5423. 
 
9 Cf. Maslow, 1961: 148. 
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psychological investigation. In this sense, a double target would be identified by the 
cathartic text of the Books. In fact, the text constantly stresses the parallel that exists 
between the concept of a non-corporeal “I” as the original source of all intentional 
propositions (the "will") and the notion of a parallel structure underlying each 
propositional expression, a mental act that dicovers behind the significant vehicle a 
constellation of meanings, pointing to an ontological organization of relationships 10and 
to the sliding doors between language and reality. This ontological universe is indeed 
the condition of understanding. By attacking the suspicion of such hidden structures 
("I", "meaning"...) , Wittgenstein dismounts the platform upon which the three major 
philosophical families - idealism, solipsism and realism – were built and developed. For 
these “families”, the legitimacy of such a fracture was never a cause for concern.  
In this way, Wittgenstein acted against a series of  institutions directly or 
indirectly affiliated with Cartesian thought, noticing, not without some irony, how the 
origin of such prejudices could be traced back to the grammatical witchcraft of which 
language is prodigious:  
 
a) The usual treatment given to the concept of "understanding" and "meaning", 
presenting them as parallel processes to sign expression 11, derives from an 
incorrect attempt to develop a grammatical analogy. We simply try to put terms 
such as "to understand" or "to think" within the family of terms that denote 
bodily activities ("to speak", "to write ", ...) thus forcing consideration of the 
"place" where thought is produced, the physiological referent (the "mind") that 
allows us to hypostasiate that kind of parallel processes.  
 
b) The elaboration of the solipsistic illusion (implied, for instance, when one 
considers descriptions of "private experiences” 12) derives from the grammatical 
privilege granted to the “first person” (characterised by a separation between the 
physionomical and the real “I”), i.e., to the inner inhabitant and voluntaristic 
centre of the body, a real ghost acting inside the corporeal machine whichfrom 
the Cartesian fission to its re-appreciation with Husserl, was always displaced to 
a domain exterior to subjectivity itself.  
 
The antidote to such exaggerations and semantical deviations would reside 
precisely in the return to expression as first and ultimate criterion for   "understanding" 
(and in fact for all the so-called "private sensations"). Wittgenstein’s solution to the 
apories raised by the ancient dichotomical perspective would consist in erecting the 
                                                 
10 Regarding this tendency to consider the "mental act" of understanding as an invokation, activated by 
the sign's expression, of an entire constellation of "images and experiences of all tied tight" (as if the mind 
constituted an enormous warehouse "where we keep everything we remember before we express it"), it is 
important to consider the example of the sign "Napoleon" proposed by Wittgenstein (The Blue Book, 
p.39) as if "Napoleon" functioned as the label of a complex matrix that materialises in the mind each time 
this character is named. 
 
11  Cf.The Blue Book, p.3: " It seems that there are certain definite mental processes bound up with the 
working of language, processes through which alone language can function. I mean the processes of 
understanding and meaning. The signs of our language seem dead without these mental processes and it 
might seem that the only function of the signs is to induce such processes (...)." 
  
12  For example, "I can’t feel his pain" (The Blue Book, p.55). 
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language game as a fundamental structure and a gravity centre essential to meaning and 
comprehension. It is the language game and no longer the mental instance, that 
constitutes the primordial and original plan upon which all dichotomies (mental - 
physical, private - public, organic - inorganic, interior - exterior, soul - body), occur. 
Most of these were in fact developed to clarify particularly obscure points of the 
language game itself,  such as for instance the strange function played by words like "I" 
or "understanding" or "meaning". They are attempts to stabilise a grammatical 
orthodoxy or mere wishes of invasion that intend to build notations more perfect than 
that of the ordinary discourse. And this latter “temptation” could be described as a sort 
of spleen that Wittgenstein reduces to a caricature:  
 
" Our ordinary language, which of all possible notations is the one which pervades all 
our life, holds our mind rigidly in one position, as it were, and in disposition sometimes 
it feels cramped, having a desire for other positions as well. Thus we sometimes wish 
for a notation which stresses the difference more strongly, makes it more obvious , than 
ordinary language does, or of one which in a particular case uses more closely similar 
forms of expression than our ordinary language.Our mental cramp is loosened when  we 
are shown the notations which fulfil our needs." (The Blue Book, p.59) 
 
It is thus possible to trace a parallel line between the positions of the Tractatus 
that defends the independence of the logico-linguistic mechanism from attempts at 
trying to extra logically justify this same mechanism, and the the Books’ inquiries into 
the grammatical witchcraft responsible for the traditional quest for that which 
supposedly acts as fundament and basis for the fabrication of meaning, comprehension 
and meaning. The difference between the Tractatus’ ideas and the conception 
assembled in both Books were nevertheless remarkable. Fundamentally, the criteria of 
manifestation of meaning, which the Tractatus presented as strictly internal to the 
logico-linguistic functioning (an autonomous and self-sufficient proceeding) became, 
with the extensively exaggerated Wittgensteinian Kehre,  eminently external and 
pragmatical criteria, a further step in a process of continuous diurnalization of language, 
especially when analysed as a normative system. From the Picture Theory’s mirror-like 
automatism one enters to the non-compendiable complexity of a living language, the 
constitutive support for our life forms, from the metaphor of the organism to the urban 
image:  
 
"Our language can be seen as an ancient city: a maze of little streets and squares, of old 
and new houses, and of houses with additions from various periods: and this surrounded 
by a multitude of new boroughs with straight regular streets and uniform houses." 
(Philosophical Investigations, §18) 
 
In fact, by promoting the translation of the linguistic proceedings into the image 
of a system or a calculus, philosophical analysis was making a totally unacceptable 
projection, one which indeed obscured the many asystematic features that compose 
much of the discourse’s functioning, and it was precisely from such an amputation that 
philosophical analysis was itself developed as a theoretical, precise, rigorous and 
scientific investigation. Now, the defence and presentation of the ludical, performative 
character of language prevented its transformation into a theoretical object (at least, 
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according to the old concept of what “theory” mean) for a process that corresponded to 
the univocal and precise demands of classical analysis was no longer a game...13  
When reading Wittgenstein, it is fundamental to bear in mind, while observing 
the linguistic phenomenon in a radically open way, that one is actually observing the 
philosophizing’s transformation. Philosophy becomes a nomadic and  strongly anti-
theoretical activity. Through the presentation of concepts such as those of “language 
game” and “use-meaning”, Wittgenstein inaugurated the generation of what Weitz 
(1973) named the “open concepts", notions that appeal to family relations and not 
essence ones, thus deviating from pretensions of unity or depth in the simple 
observation of the phenomena. Accordingly, concepts like "life forms", "family 
likeness", "drill" would evolve not as omnivorous formulations that intend to explain the 
logico-linguistic phenomenon, but rather as counter hypothesis, avoiding the false and 
pompous veil philosophically draped over the utter simplicity of language (reducing it, 
for instance, to a calculus...). A strictly descriptive function was also profoundly 
connected to this “new” wandering activity. Descriptions - "look and see" - would in 
any case be superior to explanations for what is exposed should be sufficient: there are 
in fact "family likenesses" common to the physiognomy of the different language 
games, strong marks of consanguinity that cannot be completely justified,  a familiarity 
that emerges not of the  tranquillity brought about by the identification of transitive 
characters but rather from the recognition of the diversity inherent to any linguistic 
system, an ethymological re-discovery, so to speak, of the "phenomenon", i.e., that 
which presents itself and shines:  
 
"And I want to give you the following rule of thumb: if you are puzzled about the 
nature of thought, belief, knowledge, and the like, substitute for the thought the 
expression of the thought, etc." (The Blue Book, 41-42)  
 "Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain. For what is hidden, is 
of no interest to us." (Philosophical Investigations, §126). 14  
 
 
4. The autonomy of understanding  
 
 
If the essence of the Blue Book led to the emergence of well circumscribed 
grammatical inquiries, the Brown Book was to lead into a more integral observation of 
the language game’s  global functioning. In this text, the language game would become 
a complex where the most various beams of rules of action, expression, understanding 
and meaning, would converge, in a constant connection to the life form that is reflected 
in that game (more than that: the life form that is brought into existence by the language 
                                                 
13 Cf. Fink: 1987: 17: " That which fulfils itself with lightness, (...) reveals itself to be rich and hard for 
the concept. And yet we are not able to formulate through concepts the pre-knowledge inherent to the 
knowledge we have of the game". 
 
14 The way Wittgenstein apparted himself from all pretentiously radical initiative in philosophy, 
converting philosophy to a more prosaic usage - a "skill", a special ability to "make the other see" -, 
would provoke an enormous disenchantment in the most direct of his masters - Berytrand Russell - who 
never ceased to pity this bizarre behaviour of once a so promising spirit: "The later Wittgenstein seems to 
have grown tired of serious thinking and invented a doctrine which would make such an activity 
unnecessary" (1959: 216). 
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game). As a first major exploration of the concept, the Brown Book is divided into two 
main distinct thematic blocks: the first part is devoted to pursuing the criticism of the 
traditional philosophical model, represented here by the figure of St. Augustine, 
whereas the second section deals with specific problems connected to the adoption of an 
alternative model, problems concentrated under the introduction of the operative 
concept “seeing-as" 15, a concept that denotes, from its very beginning, the 
perspectivistic, panoramic character of Wittgenstein’s activity characterised by the 
constant attempt to attend to traditional problems and perplexities by examining them in 
their own original environment, i.e., by staging them.  
Examining Augustine's texts, Wittgenstein initiated this series of reflections with 
the problem of initiation into the language game. The scene of "inheritance and 
instruction" that introduces the theme  (in a way that would repeat itself at the beginning 
of the Investigation) establishes an important demarcation between the domains of 
"ostensible explanation of words" and "ostensible teaching of words". The first one is 
presented by Augustine as the process by which the child acquires linguistic 
competence and it evolves according to pedagogical schemes such as "This piece is the 
king" 16; it depends, however, on a previous acquaintance with language, the 
participation in a complex language game. The second is developed at a more original 
level, the level of the initiation into that same game, a process which, more than to 
promote the establishment of denotative connections linking the name to the referent, 
pushes the child into the interior of a complex sphere of rules and action criteria, 
schemes that allow the progressive stabilisation of behaviour and the confident 
manipulation of the sign (its usage is its meaning):  
 
"Augustine describes the learning of human language as if the child came into a strange 
land and did not understand the language of the country; that is, as if it already had a 
language, only not this one. Or again: as if the child could  think, only not yet speak. 
And “think” would here mean something like "talk to itself"." (Philosophical 
Investigations, §32) 17 
 
Placing the question on a pedagogical level is not without consequences. And 
these consequences start at the very level of philosophy’s methodology, of how 
philosophical questioning is to be developed. Once the hypothesis of univocal 
formulations based on the safe denotative content of words (the classical binary relation  
name - reference) has been removed, one gets in its place a perspectivistic task and the 
new philosophical formulation is now based upon the strictly descriptive impetus that 
                                                 
15 The introduction of this concept must be analysed in the context of the discussion surrounding the so-
called "Aha-Erlebnisse" particularly relevant in the Austro-German scientific communities connected to 
the Gestalt Psychology movement. It is also important to remember that, as a student in Vienna's 
Pedagogical Institute, Wittgenstein had a direct contact with it the gestalt mode of educational psychology 
taught by Karl Bühler, a central author of the Austrian Gestalt movements. The influence of Gestalt 
theories upon Wittgenstein's later work (evidently noticeable in Chapter 11 of the second part of 
Philosophical Investigations) constitutes a field of analysis not yet conveniently explored.  
 
16 Cf. Philosophical Investigations, §31. 
 
17 Or the repetition of models exploring the suspicion of hidden and parallel courses that accompany the 
expression of the words, in an echo of distant voices: "Well then, thought and speech are one and the 
same thing, for the inner speech that the soul makes in silence to iself has received the special name of 
thought" (Plato, Sophist, XLVI, 257d). 
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tries to invoke and assemble the general (pragmatic) contours of the language game - 
life form - that animate each one of the problems analysed by the philosophical 
tradition. It is at this point that the notion of "panoramic representation" ['übersichtliche 
Darstellung'] appears as a product, in a permanent re-creation, of this renewed 
philosophical activity ['Tätigkeit'], an activity that is to be performed through the simple 
juxtaposition of "situation portraits" justified only by fragile and ambiguous family 
likenesses. Philosophy adopts a state of indirect communication in the double objective 
of a saying that is, prioritarily, a showing.  
In the context of this re-orientation of philosophical activity, transforming it in a 
sort of pan-optical 18 exercise, it becomes urgent to consider two high priority concepts, 
"aspect - seeing" and "aspect - shift", both of them conveniently integrated into 
Wittgenstein’s theory of "seeing - as". Through the presentation of these concepts and 
through a complex series of examples 19, Wittgenstein would question the internalistic 
way of imposing common elements between the phenomena and the main logical 
postulates of this reasoning, namely the principle of identity, the principle of the 
excluded third, the Aristotelian Hypokemeinon and its categories, etc. At the same time, 
Wittgenstein tries out the possibilities of this new contextualistic way of observing the 
external, physionomical criteria that allow us to assert relations of similarity (but not 
identity) between phenomena, appealing to the re-staging of the cases from which those 
relations come:  
 
"To say that we use the word "blue" to mean "what all these shades of colour have in 
common" by itself says nothing more than that we use the word "blue” in all these 
cases." (The Brown Book, p.135)  
 
It is then possible to establish a parallel between the theory of "use - meaning" 
and the capacity of "seeing - as". Just as the usage of a word means the mastering of a 
technique (an action performed upon the "toolbox" of the language game)  so all 
experiences of "seeing - as" depend directly on  an analogous mastering of apprehended 
techniques. Consequently, philosophical activity is to be redefined as a task of optical 
correction supplying us with different experiences of sudden "seeing - as" , and 
necessarily originating a new and augmented perception of the normative arsenal of the 
linguistic game, a perception that reflects itself in the renewed capacity to deal with 
such an arsenal 20.  
According to such "family likeness" between the “use-meaning” of the words 
and “seing-as” Erlebnisse, and stressing that we are dealing here with a progressive 
contamination between both orders of phenomena, observations involving experiences 
of "seeing - as" appeared, throughout the second half of the Brown Book, as ideal 
platforms for the observation of those "peculiar sacramental acts" by which one 
promotes the installation of magical relations between names and things. Experiences of 
                                                 
18 Philosophy as a work of art? (cf. Rossvaer, n.d.) 
 
19 The identification of "pencil" (pp.127-129), "to search" (p.129), the attribution of the adjective "red" 
(p.130), "strain" (p.132), chromatic similarities (pp.133 and next). 
 
20 Never in an autocratic way but in heterocentred one: "The order, "Look at so and so", is of the kind, 
"Turn your head in this direction"; what you will see when you do so does not enter this order." (The 
Brown Book, p.176) 
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a sudden "seeing-as" constitute excellent replicas of the first denotation experiences (the 
child’s experiences when it starts to learn its language) where a given term and, more 
than that , a precise usage, a determined behaviour, are connected to a perceptual 
organization, to an aspect:  
 
"Now when we propose to give the aspects of a drawing names, we made it appear that 
by seeing the drawing in two different ways, and each time saying something, we had 
done more than performing just this understanding action; whereas we now see that it is 
the usage of the the "names" and in fact the detail of this usage which gives the naming 
its peculiar significance." (The Brown Book, p.173) 
 
It  is in this context that Wittgenstein begins a long comparative movement 
between the grammar of "verbal understanding" (familiarity , "seeing as" ,...) and the 
grammar of "aesthetic understanding" and more precisely of "musical understanding". 
Based on the self- sufficient character of the musical expression, not translatable by 
words or images 21, and closely linking musical expression to verbal expression, 
Wittgenstein develops the criticism of the traditional conception of knowledge as a 
representation of something. This conception was in fact based upon a vectorized 
relation, an hierarchical balance between distinct planes: original - accessory, interior - 
exterior, meaning – expression, etc. Throughout the fascinating series of examples 
(mises-en-scène) of the Brown Book and by linking several moments of “seeing-as" to 
the theory of use - meaning of the words and to the aesthetic interpretation itself, one 
exhibits, in short, the autonomy of understanding, i.e., the refusal of the transitivity 
between different ontological planes that characterises the notion of " knowledge as 
representation", the refusal of a constant retroference able to go back beyond the sign or 
the expression in a never completely satisfied archaeological quest. On the contrary , 
understanding is, in the last analysis, founded upon an unsurpassable intransitivity, or 
rather, on a constant reference to the language game and to the life form that flows in 
each human action.  
The pedagogical validity of the musical model is activated at  the moment when 
its peculiar statute overrides the traditional idea of "understanding", i.e., when it 
becomes clear that the performance of the melody is the melody itself, the performative 
moment is the actual body of the musical sentence . Wittgenstein does not disassociate 
that which supposedly accompanies understanding from that which constitutes 
understanding, its manifestation, that which understanding effectively is. Going back to 
strictly linguistic domains, the expression of the sign is the sign and the sign already 
signifies. The solid frontiers of a classic semiology start to breakdown:  
 
"For understanding this sentence, we say, points to a reality outside the sentence. 
Whereas one might say 'Understanding a sentence means getting hold of its content; 
and the content of the sentence is in this sentence.' " (The Brown Book, p.167)  
"Just in this away we refer by the phrase "understanding a word" not necessarily to that  
which happens while we are saying or hearing that, but to the whole environment of the 
event of saying it." (The Brown Book, p.157)  
 
Some years later, undergo in Remarks on Colour, the sovereignity attributed to 
the language game would suffer further developments. In a return to Goethe and takes 
                                                 
21 Cf. The Brown Book, pp.166-167. 
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psychology as the perceptive phenomena, the language game would be defended as the 
normative instance of all experiences, in the consciousness that "to look" also has a 
grammar.  
 
 
5. Other ghosts: the body of rules  
 
 
The main objective that guides Wittgenstein in his incursion on the theme of 
“rule following” is to be found in his previous positions and the problem can indeed be 
traced back to the "old" theory of truth functions proposed by Wittgenstein in the 
Tractatus. In fact, since the end of the Twenties, Wittgenstein was debating an essential 
problem mining his picture theory. Basically, the problem concerned the destruction of 
the model according to which complex propositions would be able to represent that 
which they represented "pictorically", i.e., solely on the basis of their "syntactic form". 
Throughout this period of maturation of ideas, Wittgenstein abandoned the self-
sufficient character of complex propositions and attributed a heavier weight to the 
"environment" that surrounds the way in which these propositions have meaning. 
Decomposition of these complex propositions into more simple ones, thus establishing 
their referential connection to the world, would eventually be regarded by the author of 
theTractatus as a "human activity regulated by rules".  
It has to be remembered that, in the Tractatus, it was the pictorial or figurative 
relation that united the linguistic apparatus to reality in an almost instantaneous course 
of juxtaposition "complex proposition - state of affairs", "name - elementary fact". Only 
later (the transition occurred somewhere between 1933 and 1935, i.e., the period when 
Wittgenstein dictates the Books) would the idea of an automatic calculus be substituted 
by the wider metaphor of "language games" a shift which, according to Hintikka, , we 
can compare to the transition from "indoor games" to "outdoor games". All throughout 
this transition, Wittgenstein was in fact producing a double transformation:  
 
 - he abandons the theory of a "phenomenological language" and the 
correspondent phenomenological conception of rules according to which : 
 
a) the rule is a part of "the world of my thought and of my experience, i.e., of my 
phenomenological world";  
b) a mere physical entity (for example, lines on a paper or the drawing of an 
arrow) doesn't mean a thing until it is interpreted: "to understand means to 
experience the symbolic expression of a rule in a specific way" (Hintikka, 1989); 
c) rules are a part of our immediate experience;  
d) the intentional element is fundamental (an idea that Wittgenstein still regards 
as very important in his Philosophical Remarks: if one withdraws the intention 
element out of language, its entire function will collapse). The different 
meanings of a given picture (for instance, "red") are differentiated by means of a 
"mental comparison"; this punctual comparison connects the word with the case 
under analysis and it is based upon it that a given meaning of the term is 
illuminated and detached from the others; 
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 - he denies that a specific symbolical expression of the rule is essentially 
connected to the way in which this rule is followed, thus attributing the initiative to the 
language game:  
 
a) "to follow a rule" only has meaning inside the given language game in the 
same way that certain problems only have meaning when properly inscribed 
inside the specific and well determined language game - its exportation to 
another environment implies the loss of significant coordinates and the fall into a 
totally inoperative deviation of meaning;  
b) the symbolic expression of the rule is utterly insufficient and without any 
vinculative force outside the language game in which it is inscribed;  
c) the only criterion that allows us to distinguish the correct and effective usage 
of a rule resides in the language game that involves and legitimates this very 
usage; to be guided by the symbolic expression of a rule is nothing more than a 
"move" within this language game, the ultimate instance that stipulates the 
legality of certain usages and the nonsense of others;  
d) in this sense , Wittgenstein talks about "blindly following a rule" 22: the trail 
that potentiates the legitimate behaviour is not to be found in the rule tout court 
but in the language game of which this rule is only an element.  
 
Wittgenstein's previous positions were intimately dependent upon the idea of an 
"internal world of experience". The Wittgenstein one meets in the Thirties and 
afterwards was, as we have seen, completely against this "interiority myth" and 
constantly reaffirms his preoccupation in examining the different cases he was dealing 
with  (cases that exemplified a specific linguistic competence), without any references 
or retroreferences: Wittgenstein prevents the observation of such cases (namely those 
that illustrate behaviours that are subject to a rule) either upstream, by denouncing the 
"interiority myth and by rejecting all speculations involving " psychical processes", as 
well as downstream - grammar does not answer to reality and the rules that constitute it 
are not found and deduced from the world emerging rather like conventions built to one 
side 23. These cases are then to be analysed in a "laboratorial" state which allows us to 
observe the fundamental relations established between the linguistic environment, the 
symbolic expression of a rule and the act originated by both 24. 
The  moment when Wittgenstein abandons the previous theory is to be found, 
according to Hintikka (1989), in manuscript MS (116) written sometime between the 
years 1934 and 1937 and where we can read:  
 
"May I also describe in a different way what the application rules say about the words 
in question, namely by describing the process that takes place when someone 
                                                 
22 Philosophical Innvestigations, §219. 
 
23 "We cannot deduce the cube's geometry from the contemplation of the cube. Rules do not come out of 
an act of understanding." (Lectures).  
 
24 To this double effort of prevention, both upstream as well as downstream, one has to connect the 
statement of The Brown Book that says that what is under consideration here is the overcoming of the 
realist and idealist models and their substitution by that which Bouveresse (1987) calls Wittgenstein's 
"minimal non-cognitivism". 
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understands (means) a word?  
Previously I thought that grammar rules were an explanation of what I experience when 
I use the word. They were consequences or expressions of the properties that I 
momentarily experience when I understand the words."  
 
Rules would be obtained  when we start paying attention to what is experienced 
when we hear or understand a specific word. The deductivistic character of this previous 
position is clear: each word would have behind it or beneath it, so to speak, a "body of 
meaning" ['Bedeutungskörper']" that would be discovered during this learning, a process 
one could compare to the Platonic ascendant dialectics. The criticism of this body of 
meaning would occupy Wittgenstein in the first 138 paragraphs of the Philosophical 
Investigations after which (§§139-242) he would attack a more subtle but no less 
harmful conception: the "body of rules" ['Regelskörper'] thesis according to which each 
rule was regarded, similar to the "body of meaning"  theory, as the visible peak of a pre-
established vehicle responsible "in a mysterious and magical way" (Bouveresse, 1987: 
33) for the expression's meaning, imposing upon the expression an exclusive and quite 
determined conduct. This was in fact, grosso modo, Frege's theory, for whom the 
apprehension of the "abstract entity" corresponding to each word and from which every 
word receives  its meaning and its usage possibilities, could not be explained at all due 
to the mysterious character of this entity (it is neither a physical structure nor a mental 
one).  "Picture" is the only term Frege finds suitable to name this entity. In this context, 
Wittgenstein writes about the need that we apparently feel to invoke such pictures 
(completely redundant and of no use whatsoever) every time we deal with a "superlative 
fact" 25.  
Under this topic, we should also take  into account Wittgenstein's considerations 
on the "harshness of logical obligation," or on "logic's inexorability" as if there was a 
"logical mechanism" making invisible movements behind the signs and imposing on 
them "from the inside out" a well determined course.  
Going back to MS 116, the moment when Wittgenstein changes his thought is 
noticeable:  
 
"In my previous exposition, grammar rules seem to be an explanation of what I 
experience when I use the word. They would be consequences or expressions of the 
properties I experience when I listen to the word.  
But this must be a nonsense."  
 
From this moment on, to follow a rule would no longer be identified either with 
the behaviour of following a predetermined formula as with the fact of accessing some 
specific experiences. 
Wittgenstein wanted to delete this detective-like atmosphere involving the 
understanding of symbols as if everything could be explained by the fantastic discovery 
of a mysterious Fundament hidden under the words. However this depuration does not 
mean at any moment the abandoning of all pre-determination, which would constitute a 
fall into an extreme relativism. One still has an entire structure of necessary connections 
but of an exclusively grammatical type. It is, so to speak, an historicised necessity, 
contingent, unpredictable and with roots reaching down into "natural history" in the 
                                                 
25 "The Regelsköper mythology transfers to the rules the magical power initially attributed to meanings" 
(Bouveresse, 1987: 36).  
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course of which the grammatical links of our language games were constituted. This 
contingency is a consequence of the autonomous character of our grammar: all the 
connections are imposed within the grammatical body and they do not refer to any real 
or natural  rhythms of the phenomena.  
This grammatical autonomy however does not imply the "destitution of the 
referential language" or the idea of language's self- referentiality. In fact, Wittgenstein 
never really abandoned the idea of language’s representative function. If the "second 
Wittgenstein" is easily identifiable with a certain "semantic abstinence" (Hintikka, 
1989), the harmony between thought and reality is always safeguarded by the Austrian 
philosopher even if it now means an "intragrammatical articulation" and no longer a 
"metaphysical correspondence".  
  Grammatical autonomy does not mean "general irresponsibility" or absolute 
relativism. Suffice to mention, for instance, that Wittgenstein never wrote that 
Mathematics would be able to create facts that would not exist without it; he only stated 
that mathematics determined "the character of that which we call 'fact' ". 
In this sense, Wittgenstein would recuperate the example preferred by the 
relativists, i.e., the semantics of colour concepts, but only to conclude that the autonomy 
of conceptual systems regarding the world does not mean the anullment of the 
autonomy and sovereignty of the world whereas relativism ended up attributing to the 
subject the entire power to conventionally organise the symbols. It is to be noted, for 
example, that we won't find two or more completely different conceptual systems based 
upon the same natural facts or the same characteristics of human nature. The differences 
that can emerge from the comparison between two different conceptual games that 
emerge from the same reference soil are not fundamental. The example of this can be 
taken from Remarks on Frazer's The Golden Bough where Wittgenstein contradicts the 
ethnocentricity of the famous British anthropologist:  
 
"I would like to say: nothing shows better our similarity with these savages as the fact 
that Fraser has a word so familiar to them as well as to us, as "ghost" or "spirit" in order 
to describe the visions of this people".  
 
Meanwhile, in Bemerkungen über die Farben, reflecting upon the way we can 
imagine human beings with chromatic concepts radically different from our own, the 
conclusion is that this is an impossible task: an incommensurability between conceptual 
systems could only be conceivable if for every system there was a different world. The 
colour concepts of an hypothetical extraterrestrial would have to be, simultaneously, 
sufficiently apart from our own concepts (in order to be really different) and sufficiently 
close (so that we could at least acknowledge them as chromatic concepts):  
 
"Because life would develop in a different way. That which interests us would 
not interest them. Different concepts would no longer  be unimaginable. In fact, 
essentially different concepts can only be imaginable in this way. " (Zettel, §388)  
 
As Bouveresse (1987) wrote, it  is impossible to determine a priori "what can or 
cannot interest human beings in general" or the new concepts they can arrive at, since 
reality still holds a very important function: it is reality that ultimately decides whether a 
given concept is or not applicable (a linguistic Darwinism?...). From here it follows 
naturally the label of  "sober realism" that Wiggins (1980: 133-134) pastes to 
Comentário: Inserir o modus 
tollens de  griffin em rodapé. 
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Wittgenstein's conceptualism: we create our grammar but we do not invent the reality 
that it allows us to describe.  
Necessary connections and the essentialistic burden of the terms are taken of the 
plane of the object’s properties and reviewed as structures of a grammatical order. The 
very tendency to make these grammatical contributions part of the other properties-
ingredients of things is in itself a grammatical suggestion.  
 
" ‘Essential’ is never a property of the object but rather the character of the 
concept."(Lectures).  
"That which corresponds to a necessity in the world must be that which, in language, 
seems to be an arbitrary rule." (Lectures)  
 
This does mean however that Wittgenstein adopted a pure and simple 
conventionalism. From the fact that the rule does not have a real correspondent cannot 
be inferred that nothing corresponds to it in reality. As we have seen, there is at least 
one validation at the level of the worldly plane, i.e., we can invoke reasons in favour of 
the applicablity, utility and even indispensability of the rule adopted in the given case, 
but this doesn't mean however that we should identify the rule with an essential "fact" 
susceptible of making it "true".  
Here lies a fundamental distinction separating Quine from Wittgenstein: for the 
former, the elimination of the Bedeutungskörper's mythology implies the rejection of 
the very concept of necessity, whereas for the latter, the difference between "necessary 
propositions" and "contingent propositions" is irrevocable and is kept as the difference 
that separates the rules of the game (necessary propositions determine the meaning 26) 
and the moves made according to those rules (empirical statements, contingent 
propositions correspond to an usage of meaning).  
Moreover, Wittgenstein considers it "deceptive and, in a certain way, very 
dangerous" (Lectures) to qualify as "arbitrary" the rules of the mathematical game and, 
in consequence, the rules of any language game. This type of qualification denounces a 
certain "accomodation" to hypostasiation common, in general, to all language games. 
This is in fact a temptation that hinders the consideration of a founding structure harsher 
than reality itself and with a more superior natural organization - the grammar that rules 
our language and our ways of usage.  
The fact that rules are applicable to reality constitutes the most intimate relation 
possible between the linguistic order and the real order and it is through this relation 
that the concrete reference enters the conceptual sphere:  
 
"The usage technique of a word gives us an idea of very general truths regarding the 
world in which the word is used, truths that in fact are so general that do not attract 
people's attention (nor even, and I'm sorry to say it, the philosophers'attention)." 
(Lectures)  
 
 
 
 
Bibliography 
                                                 
26 In such a way that Wittgenstein would call the "meaningless ['sinnlos'] propositions" of the Tractatus, 
i.e., tautologies and contradictions, "degenerated rules" (cf. Bouveresse, 1987: 106).  
 
17 
 
 
 
BOUVERESSE, J. (1987): La Force de la Règle, Paris 
 
HINTIKKA, J., (1989): “Rules, Games and Experiences: Wittgenstein’s Discussion of 
Rule-following in the Light of his Development”, in Révue Internationale de 
Philosophie, n.169, 279-297 
 
FINK, E., (1987): Le Jeu comme Symbole du Monde, (trans. by H. Lindenberg), Paris 
 
MACCARTHY, D. (1990): “The philosophy of Logical wholism”, in HINTIKKA, J. 
(ed.), Wittgenstein in Florida, Dordrecht, 51-123 
 
MASLOW, A.(1961): A study on Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, Berkeley and Los Angeles 
 
RIVERSO, E. (1970): Il pensiero di Ludovico Wittgenstein, Napoli 
 
ROSSVAER, V. (n.d.): “Philosophy as an art form”, in JOHANNESSEN and 
NORDENSTRAM (eds.), Wittgenstein: Aesthetics and Transcendental Philosophy, 25-
31 
 
RUSSELL, B. (1959): My philosophical development, New York 
 
STERN, D. (1991): “The ‘Middle Wittgenstein’: from Logical Atomism to Practical 
Holism”, in HINTIKKA, J. (ed.), Wittgenstein in Florida, Dordrecht, 203-226 
 
WEITZ, M. (1973): “Wittgenstein’s Aesthetics”, in TILGHMAN, B. (ed.), Language 
and Aesthetics, Wichita, 7-19 
 
WIGGINS, D. (1980): Sameness and Substance, Oxford, 1980 
 
WITTGENSTEIN, L.: Tagebücher 1914-1916, Frankfurt-am-Main, 1990 
 
WITTGENSTEIN, L.: Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Frankfurt-am-Main, 1990 
 
WITTGENSTEIN, L.: Philosophische Untersuchungen, Frankfurt-am-Main, 1990 
 
WITTGENSTEIN, L.: Zettel, Frankfurt-am-Main, 1990 
 
 WITTGENSTEIN, L.: Philosophical Investigations (trans. by G.E.M. Anscombe), 
Oxford, 1997 
 
WITTGENSTEIN, L.: “Remarks on Frazer’s The Golden Bough” (trans. by J. 
Beversluis), in LUCKHARDT (ed.), Wittgenstein, Sources and Perspectives, New 
York, 1979 
 
WITTGENSTEIN, L.: The Blue and Brown Books, Oxford, 1980 
 
WITTGENSTEIN, L.: Bemerkungen über die Farben, Lisboa, 1987 
18 
 
 
 
WITTGENSTEIN, L.: “Wittgenstein’s Lectures in 1930-33”, in MOORE, G. (ed.), 
Philosophical Papers, London, 1959 
 
 
 
 
